Water Law Review
Volume 20

Issue 2

Article 37

1-1-2017

Granite Cty. Bd. Of Com'rs v. McDonald, 383 P.3d 740 (Mont 2016)
Megan McCulloch

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Megan McCulloch, Court Report, Granite Cty. Bd. Of Com'rs v. McDonald, 383 P.3d 740 (Mont 2016), 20 U.
Denv. Water L. Rev. 460 (2017).

This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

460

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 20

adopted the federal approach to invalidated rules and held that lower court did
not err by reinstating the 1987 rule.
Finally, the Court considered the Well Driller's argument that the lower
court could not require the DNRC to initiate rulemaking consistent with the
order. The Court reasoned that, because courts have the authority to "pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect," the lower court could require rulemaking to be consistent with its order. However, the Court agreed that the
District Court could not compel DNRC to initiate a new rulemaking. Because
it is the DNRC's responsibility to adopt necessary rules, it is the DNRC's decision whether or not to keep the reinstated 1987 rule.
Accordingly, the Court partially affined the lower court's decision invalidating the 1993 rule.
Justice Jim Rice, dissenting.
Justice Rice dissented. He did not find the plain language of the statute
"clear on its face." He found it strange that the Court's ruling implied that the
"DNRC inexplicably misinterpreted and misapplied a clear statute for the past
23 years." Rather, he thought the Court found the significant increase in exempt
appropriations startling and acted as a legislative body to correct a perceived
policy failing.
N. RiouxJordan
Granite Cty. Bd. Of Com'rs v. McDonald, 383 P.3d 740 (Mont 2016)
(holding the Water Court did not err in its interpretation of a 1906 decree stating a reservoir owner must release not less than 1200 miner's inches of water
for senior downstream appropriators during irrigation season, while also enjoining downstream users from demanding more than the natural flow of the creek
above the dam in times of shortage).
This case came before the Supreme Court of Montana as an appeal from
a decision of the Water Court regarding the decree from a 1906 case, the interpretation of which clarified disputed water rights between Granite County ("the
County") and McDonald, a private party.
The rights under dispute in is case arose from the terms of the 1906 Decree
in Montana Water, Electric and Mining Co. v. Schuh, decided by the United
States District Court for the District of Montana. That court granted Montana
Water, Electric and Mining Company ("the Company"), the predecessor to
Granite County, water rights associated with storage of Flint Creek water in the
Georgetown Lake reservoir for the purposes of generating hydro-electric power.
McDonald, who is a successor to one of the defendants in that case, objected
to the County's water right claims, two of which arise out of the Schuh Decree.
The root of the controversy in Schuh is the Decree's seemingly conflicting
language. The Decree states that during irrigation season, the Company must
cause to flow into the channel of Flint Creek "not less than 1200 miner's inches"
of water below its electric plant, enjoining the Company from diverting water
from the creek decreed to downstream users. At the same time, the Decree
recognized downstream user's rights were limited to the natural inflow of the
creek. As a result, the Company was prohibited from releasing any amount
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exceeding that of the "average natural flow" which, during the irrigation season,
does not "exceed 1200 miner's inches" of water.
For purposes of this case the Water Court defined "natural inflow" as that
amount of water that would pass through the creek without interference from
the dam and defined "storage water" as water from the natural flow of the creek
that was impounded for use during times of low natural flow.
Applying the analysis in Schuh, the court had to determine whether the
Decree intended that the reservoir release 1200 miner's inches of storage water
throughout the irrigation season, or whether Granite County was only required
to release to downstream users that amount equivalent to the natural inflow of
the creek above the dam. McDonald argued that the wording in Schuh required
the County to maintain a constant flow of not less than 1200 miner's inches of
water for senior downstream appropriators to use at all times during irrigation
season regardless of the natural flow of the creek into the reservoir. The County
contended it was only required to release the natural inflow of Flint Creek, and
not to release storage water from the reservoir when the natural inflow from the
creek fell below 1200 miner's inches.
The Water Court looked to other decisions of the Montana Supreme
Court, explaining that limiting downstream users to the natural conditions of a
stream at the time of appropriation and not considering storage water as part of
the natural flow of a creek was consistent with established Montana Law. The
Water Court further explained that Montana case law has recognized that downstream appropriators may not demand release of storage water exceeding the
natural inflow of the creek. Though the Schuh Decree did not state this explicitly, the language of the Decree implicitly recognizes this principle. The Schuh
court's decision was consistent with the law as it applies to storage rights, which
recognizes natural flow may only be impounded for storage purposes when
there is enough water to satisfy rights of senior downstream appropriators.
However, a reservoir is not required to release lawfully impounded storage water to downstream appropriators in times of low natural flow.
In interpreting seemingly conflicting statements in the Schuh Decree, the
Water Court determined the Schuh court did not intend for downstream users
to receive a benefit that the law did not provide; in this case, the mandatory
release of storage water is the unintended benefit. Instead, the Schuh court's
instruction that the Company release 1200 miner's inches "at all times" was
designed to ensure that the water that was used in the hydroelectric plant was
returned to the creek and not diverted elsewhere. It was not meant to be interpreted that the Company release 1200 miner's inches at all times during irrigation season regardless of natural flow levels of Flint Creek. The Water Court
held this was consistent with the County's contention that it was not required to
release storage water for downstream appropriators to use during times of shortage.
The Supremne Court affirmed the Water Court's decision, concluding that
the Schuh Court did not intend for downstream appropriators to have a right
to water stored behind an upstream damn as long as the dam operator released
that amnount of water which would naturally flow through the stream without the
interference of the damn.
The final issue the Water Court contemplated was McDonald's assertion
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that principles of claim preclusion estopped the County from contending that it
was not required to release 1200 miner's inches of water at all times during
irrigation season. The Water Court dismissed a res judicata argument on
grounds that both parties agreed the point under dispute was the interpretation
of rights the Schuh Decree already recognized, and interpreting a decree is not
the same as re-litigating issues of fact already decided in it. The Water Court
next considered McDonald's claim of judicial estoppel. The court dismissed
the claim, finding her argument failed because she showed no evidence the
County intended to commit fraud or abuse the judicial process, thus failing to
demonstrate all the elements of judicial estoppel.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Water Court's dismissal of McDonald's
estoppel argument, holding the Water Court properly applied the principles of
claim preclusion upon which McDonald relied.
In a specially concurring opinion, justice McKinnon agreed with the opinion of the court that downstream appropriators have no right to water stored
behind an upstream dam as long as the dam operator releases that amount of
water which would naturally flow through the stream without the interference
of the dam. She concurred specially to opine that the Schuh Decree established
a quantity of natural flow above the dam only, and this did not enjoin senior
downstream appropriators from using in excess of 1200 miner's inches when
the natural inflow of the Flint Creek exceeded 1200 miner's inches. Similarly,
the Decree did not require the Company to draw from its reservoir to supplement inflow rates when they dropped below 1200 miner's inches.
Megan McCuloch
NEBRASKA
Lingenfelter v. Lower Elkhorn Nat. Res. Dist, 881 N.W.2d 892 (Neb.
2016) (holding that (i) a farmer's uncontroverted claim that he had received
approval to irrigate his land did not constitute approval by a Natural Resource
District to irrigate those lands; (ii) a Natural Resources District's cease-and-desist order against the farmer was proper because the district created a rule that
prohibited farmers from irrigating undesignated land without obtaining approval; and (iii) the district's rules of land designation were not arbitrary and
capricious and did not violate the farmer's due process or equal protection
rights).
The Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act ("Act") created twelve Natural Resources Districts ("NRDs") within the state. NRDs have
authority to regulate ground water. The NRDs' legislative purpose is to develop, manage, utilize, and conserve groundwater and surface-water. NRDs set
limits on total ground water usage, require practices that promote the efficiency
of ground water usage, and "limit or prevent the expansion of irrigated acres."
This authority allows NRDs to protect groundwater quantity and quality. State
legislators deemed this protection as "essential to the general welfare." Since
the Act's adoption in 1975, NRDs have gained increasingly more authority to
regulate Nebraska's groundwater. By 1996, the NRDs' authority was extended
to regulate surface water that was hydrologically connected to groundwater.
The Lower Elkhorn Natural Resources District ("District") is the NRD that

